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Abstract
Learning has been studied extensively in the context of isolated individuals. However, many organisms are social and
consequently make decisions both individually and as part of a collective. Reaching consensus necessarily means that a
single option is chosen by the group, even when there are dissenting opinions. This decision-making process decouples the
otherwise direct relationship between animals’ preferences and their experiences (the outcomes of decisions). Instead,
because an individual’s learned preferences influence what others experience, and therefore learn about, collective
decisions couple the learning processes between social organisms. This introduces a new, and previously unexplored,
dynamical relationship between preference, action, experience and learning. Here we model collective learning within
animal groups that make consensus decisions. We reveal how learning as part of a collective results in behavior that is
fundamentally different from that learned in isolation, allowing grouping organisms to spontaneously (and indirectly) detect
correlations between group members’ observations of environmental cues, adjust strategy as a function of changing group
size (even if that group size is not known to the individual), and achieve a decision accuracy that is very close to that which
is provably optimal, regardless of environmental contingencies. Because these properties make minimal cognitive demands
on individuals, collective learning, and the capabilities it affords, may be widespread among group-living organisms. Our
work emphasizes the importance and need for theoretical and experimental work that considers the mechanism and
consequences of learning in a social context.
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Introduction
Associative learning tunes an organism’s behavior to exploit
statistical patterns in the environment and can improve decision-
making accuracy across a wide range of scenarios [1–2]. In the
vast majority of experiments on learning, the subject of study has
been a single individual in isolation (see [3–4] for reviews). When
learning alone, there is a direct relationship between an animal’s
intentions and its actions: the animal observes cues in the
environment and performs a behavioral response. The conse-
quences of the behavior (such as a reward or punishment) may
alter the animal’s valuation of the environmental cues, resulting in
a feedback loop that gradually tunes its behavior to its
environment [3–7].
In contrast to this relatively simple scenario, many animals –
including the majority of species commonly employed in learning
experiments, such as rats, pigeons, and humans – live and forage
naturally in social groups. Sociality offers many benefits to
individuals, including improved sensing and decision-making [8–
9], decreased risk of predation [10–16], improved foraging success
[8,16–21], and the capacity for thermoregulation [22]. For these
and other species (e.g., fish [8,16–18,20–21,23], birds [24–25],
ants [20], honeybees [26], cockroaches [27] primates [28–29], and
meerkats [30]), decisions are not made in isolation. Instead, in
order to preserve the benefits of sociality, animal groups often
must come to a consensus regarding where and when to travel or
forage, despite the presence of dissenting opinions. While not
universal amongst social animals, consensus decision-making is
widespread in nature [15,31–34], but does not necessarily imply
that individuals are altruistic or highly cooperative. While
members of some groups may be highly related (such as ants,
honeybees, and primates), for many other species (such as some
fish and birds), group members are unrelated to each other, and
individuals obtain direct fitness benefits from maintaining group
cohesion. These benefits provide a strong incentive for individuals
to remain together, providing a platform for other emergent
phenomena such as collective learning, which we explore here.
A common means by which consensus is achieved in animal
groups is through relatively local responses to the positions or
motion of others. Thus, in many species, such as schooling fish
[16,23,35–37] or flocking birds [25,38–39], individuals must
reconcile any personal directional preferences with their social
tendency (to avoid isolation, and to copy the movement decisions
made by others). Spatially explicit models of collective movement
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(or ‘swarming’) are commonly employed to describe mobile animal
groups. In these models, individuals interact only with near
neighbors, such as individuals within a certain Euclidian distance
(metric models) or a set number of nearest neighbors regardless of
distance (topological models) [38,40]. These neighbors may change
through time due to the motion of individuals (time-varying
networks) [23,35–36,39–45]. For this class of opinion dynamics
models, groups are typically highly cohesive, and the motion of
groups is well approximated by simple majority rule when
collectively deciding between discrete options (see supplemental text
S1 and figures S1,S2). Effective consensus thus emerges from local
interactions among individuals. Although individuals cannot explic-
itly ‘tally votes,’ they nevertheless exhibit the capacity to select,
collectively, the direction preferred by the majority when conflicting
preferences exist [23,25,43], even in the presence of a ‘strongly
opinionated’ minority [23]. Consequently it is not necessary to
simulate the full spatial dynamics to capture accurately the outcome
of consensus decision-making by organisms [23].
One consequence of consensus decision-making (regardless of
the precise mechanism by which consensus is achieved) is that it
breaks the direct relationship between individual preference and
action. An individual’s preferences may be overridden by those of
others, such that the individual experiences a part of the
environment that it would not have had it been alone. This alters
what individuals learn about their environment and also implies
that learning by multiple grouping individuals becomes coupled;
the preferences of one individual can affect what another
experiences, and what one individual learns can affect the future
learning of other individuals in the group. Social learning allows
individuals of many social species to learn by observing the
behaviors of conspecifics [46–52]. Individuals tend to follow the
decisions of others when their personal information is unreliable
[53] or costly to acquire [54]. Nonetheless, associative learning has
not been investigated in a social context. Furthermore, the
majority of experiments on social learning study a single test
subject (the observer), separated from conspecific demonstrators
(e.g. [53–59]). In a freely behaving group, however, each
individual can simultaneously act as demonstrator and observer,
resulting in a coupling between preferences, which potentially
affects the learned behavior of all individuals in the group.
The impact of these coupled dynamics on associative learning in
animal groups has yet to be explored, despite the fact that
associative learning (whereby individuals learn to associate
environmental cues with rewards), occurs in all organisms with a
nervous system [60–61]. Since consensus decisions break the direct
feedback between preference and experience, it is not clear to
what degree learning is beneficial in a collective context, whether
learning rules in a social context need to be more complex (such as
group size or context dependent) in order to be effective, or how
learning in isolation and subsequently pooling opinions as a group
compares with learning as part of a collective.
Furthermore, natural environments typically contain not one,
but potentially many informative cues, and a crucial challenge for
animals is to learn the appropriate relative usefulness of the cues in
order to maximize decision accuracy. Optimal voting theory [62]
demonstrates that the relative value of environmental cues
depends on group size as well as the properties of the cues.
Similar to decision-making in isolation, the reliability of a cue (the
probability that it accurately predicts a reward or punishment) is
important. Unique to collective decision-making, however, and of
central importance, is the observational correlation of a cue (the
similarity between two individuals’ observations) (figure 1) [63]. In
nature, some cues may be subject to relatively low observational
correlation, such as cryptic visual cues, where individuals exhibit a
relatively independent probability of correctly observing accurate
information from the cue [21]. Other cues, however, likely result
in high correlation, such as loud auditory cues, strong environ-
mental odors, or large visual landmarks that can readily be
perceived by all individuals in the group. For high correlation cues,
group members perceive similar observations of the cues, such that
there is a high probability that they all receive true (or false)
information (figure 1). Because correlations decrease the indepen-
dence of observations made by different group members, they
limit the benefits derived from aggregating observations [62–63].
In general, for group-living animals the optimal behavior is to rely
primarily on those cues that are less correlated and those that
more reliably lead to rewards [62].
Here we present a general framework for studying collective
learning and consensus decision-making in animal groups
(figure 2). In this framework, we simulate individual associative
learning as in the existing literature, i.e., we do not make any new
assumptions regarding the mechanisms by which individuals learn
to associate cues with rewards, nor do we afford additional
cognitive abilities to individuals. However, we place individual
learning within the context of consensus decision-making, as
exhibited by many self-organized animal groups [15,32–34]. Our
framework is agnostic to the mechanism by which animal groups
reach consensus, and thus our conclusions are consistent with both
spatial and non-spatial models of collective decision-making. This
allows us to focus on the coupled dynamics between consensus
decisions and associative learning, a previously unexplored aspect
of animal collective behavior.
Model
We consider a group of N individuals choosing between a
number of discrete options. Here we model two options (which we
denote as option A and option B), for simplicity, and because in
nature many decisions are binary (such as whether or not to flee
from a potential predator, whether or not to approach a shelter, or
selecting among potential areas in which to forage). In a given
trial, either option is equally likely to be superior a priori (a
uniform prior over the options); therefore, all of the information
available to individuals is contained in the environmental cues. We
Author Summary
Learning is ubiquitous among animal species, allowing
individuals to adjust their behavior in response to their
environment to improve their chances of survival and
reproduction. However, while many animals live and make
decisions within social groups, it is not well understood
how associative learning functions within a social context.
We describe an empirically derived model of collective
learning and compare the learned performance of animals
within groups to the optimal behavior for a wide range of
environmental conditions and group sizes. We find that
the learning rules derived from experiments with individ-
ual animals readily generalize to a social context, and these
relatively simple rules result in behavior that is close to
optimal, even when individuals know neither the size of
their group nor the properties of environmental cues.
Individuals that learn in isolation and subsequently join
together as a group make substantially worse decisions.
These results demonstrate the importance of learning
within a collective context and highlight the need for
experimental work to investigate the role of collective
learning in enhancing decision accuracy in animal groups.
Collective Learning in Animal Groups
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assume that the individuals in the group employ consensus
decision-making, and, for tractability, that the reward (e.g., safety
from a predator) is shared equally among individuals in the group.
(a) The informational environment
In order to gain information about the quality of the two
options, individuals observe environmental cues, which could be
odor, visual, auditory, or other sensory cues (figure 2a). Each cue
indicates to each individual that one or the other option is superior
on that particular trial. For simplicity we assume two such cues.
Since individuals in groups must differentiate between cues with
different degrees of observational correlation in order to improve
collective accuracy [62], in our model one of the cues has low
correlation (i.e., observations of the cue by individuals in the group
are independent of each other, such that individuals may have
opposing information from this cue regarding which is the superior
option), while the other cue has high correlation (i.e., all
individuals make the same observation of the cue and agree
about which option this cue indicates is superior; figure 1) [63].
The reliability of a cue is the probability that it correctly predicts
the superior option. These reliabilities are denoted by rL and rH
for the low and high correlation cues, respectively, and can range
from 0.5 to 1. Effective collective learning would allow individuals
in groups to give additional value to the low correlation cue
(beyond its reliability), due to the benefit of multiple independent
observations that cue affords. Consequently, the most interesting
scenario is that in which one cue has lower correlation while the
other cue has higher reliability, i.e., rLvrH .
(b) Individual decision-making
Individuals translate their observations of the two environmen-
tal cues into a discrete preference, or vote, for one of the two
options. Following well-established psychological models of
decision-making by isolated individuals, we assume that the
individual rule is to vote for an option with a probability
proportional to the sum of the associative strengths (see below)
of all of the environmental cues that indicate that option. Thus,
individuals vote for option A with a probability PiA(t) and option B
with probability PiB(t)~1{P
i
A(t), where t is the current trial, and
i indicates a particular individual. In our model, because we have
only two cues and two options, from the perspective of an
individual there are only two possible scenarios: either the two cues
both indicate the same option is superior, or they indicate different
options. When the two cues indicate that the same option is
Figure 1. The observational correlation of cues. (a) Observational correlation describes the degree to which observations made by different
group members are independent of each other. A low correlation cue provides group members with independent observations, while a high
correlation cue provides just one observation to all group members on a given trial. (b) Exclusive use of a low correlation cue results in a monotonic
increase in collective accuracy as group size increases (green solid line), a hallmark of collective wisdom (rL~0:6). In contrast, exclusive use of a low
correlation cue shows no increase in collective accuracy with group size (black solid line; rH~0:8). A mixed strategy, whereby individuals
probabilistically choose one of the cues, may lead to collective accuracy greater than that obtained from using either of the cues exclusively when
rLvrH .
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003762.g001
Collective Learning in Animal Groups
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superior, the voting rule implies that an individual always votes for
that option. However, when the two cues indicate opposing
options, an individual votes for the option indicated by the low or
high correlation cue with a probability proportional to the
associative strength of that cue. We denote the probability of
choosing the option indicated by the low correlation cue as pi(t),
irrespective of whether the low correlation cue indicated option A
or option B. Similarly, the probability that an individual votes for
the option indicated by the high correlation cue is 1{pi(t)
(figure 2b).
(c) Consensus decision-making
Once individuals have formed an opinion about which option
they consider superior, these opinions must be aggregated in order
to produce a collective decision. For some species, social
interactions are weak and temporary. Other species, however,
are strongly social, and empirical work has shown that, despite
employing different interaction rules, many animal species,
including primates [28–29], meerkats [30], fish [16–18,20,23],
and insects [20,27], typically make consensus decisions. Our
model does not consider the precise mechanism by which
individuals interact, since here it is the outcome of consensus
decision-making, and its relationship to individual associative
learning, that is important (however, we demonstrate, in
supplemental text S1 and figure S2, that considering the specifics
of interactions, such as by simulating local spatial interactions
among individuals [23,41,43], does not affect our conclusions).
Based on experimental evidence from many types of animal
groups [17–18,20–21,23,32–33] we assume that individuals can,
and often do, select the option preferred by the majority
(figure 2c). Further empirical and theoretical work has demon-
strated that the presence in the group of individuals with no
preferences can even strengthen majority rule in animal groups
[23]. As shown by spatially-explicit models of mobile animal
groups and in experiments, when there are equal numbers of votes
for each option, the group is able to avoid a deadlock and chooses
an option randomly [23,25,43] (supplemental text S1 and figure
S2).
(d) Individual learning
After the group chooses one of the options, individuals
experience the outcome (the presence or absence of a reward)
and employ an associative learning rule to update their knowledge
of the environment based on this experience (figure 2d). Following
standard models of learning in the psychology literature,
knowledge of the environment is encoded by an ‘associative
strength’ for each environmental cue. Each individual i stores two
associative strengths, ViL(t) and V
i
H (t), representing, respectively,
the individual’s valuation of the low and high correlation cue.
Individuals in our model do not explicitly estimate the size of the
group they are in, nor the observational correlation or reliabilities
of the cues, which all contribute to determining the optimal voting
behavior (see below). It is not known to what extent animals are
aware of the size of the group to which they belong, and it is likely
that many animals under consideration in this model are unable to
accurately estimate group size, either because of limited cognitive
abilities, because the group may be large or fluctuating, making
estimates of its size difficult, or because of the local nature of
interactions [64]. Similarly, it is not known whether individuals
can estimate the observational correlation of cues; therefore, in this
model we employ a conservative approach, and assume that they
are unable to do so (also, as we will show, they need not be able to
do so). In short, we do not make new assumptions about the
process by which associative learning occurs [3–6].
At the start of a simulation, all individuals lack any knowledge of
the two cues and therefore the associative strengths for both cues
are identical and very small (ViL~V
i
H&0). Also, following
standard models of learning, individuals update the associative
strength(s) only of the cue(s) that indicated the option that was
ultimately selected by the group. Associative strengths of cues are
updated according to the following learning rule, which is similar
to the well-known and experimentally-validated [3–6,65–69]
Figure 2. Flowchart of the collective learning process. (a) A decision trial begins with individuals observing cues in the environment. In this
model we have two cues, one with low observational correlation and one with high correlation. (b) Individuals use the low correlation cue with
probability pi(t) and the high correlation cue with probability 1{pi(t) in order to form a discrete vote for one of the two options. In the case that
both cues indicate the same option, the individual always votes for that option. (c) The votes are aggregated and a consensus decision is made by
simple majority rule. (d) The resulting reward or punishment is used to update each individual’s voting behavior. A learning rule similar to the
Rescorla-Wagner learning rule is used to update the associative strength(s) of the cue(s) that were present at the chosen option. The associative
strengths determine pi(t) and therefore how an individual votes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003762.g002
Collective Learning in Animal Groups
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Rescorla-Wagner rule: Vi(tz1)~Vi(t)za(l{(ViL(t)zV
i
H (t))),
where a is the learning rate (here taken to be 0.1), l is 1 if the
option selected by the group was the superior option and 0 if it was
not [5,7], and V represents the associative strength of any cue that
indicated the option chosen by the group. In general, this
individual learning rule increases the associative strength of cues
that are consistently paired with a positive outcome (the superior
option) and decreases those that are paired with a negative
outcome (the inferior option) and therefore serves as a memory of
past events. Because individuals observe independent and poten-
tially different information from the low correlation cue, only a
fraction of the group will update the associative strength for that
cue on a given trial. This results in individuals in a group
potentially learning different associative strengths for the cues
despite sharing a common experience of decision outcomes. The
associative strengths are related to the voting behavior in the
following way: pi(t)~ViL(t)=(V
i
L(t)zV
i
H (t)). Equivalently, indi-
viduals vote for an option proportionally to the total associative
strength of the cues they perceive as indicating that option. This
linear mapping between associative strengths and voting behavior
is common in models of learning [7], although we explore
alternate mappings and demonstrate in the supplemental text S2
and figure S3 that this does not impact the results.
During the course of repeated trials, an individual’s associative
strengths are modified, leading to a change in its probabilities
PiA(t) and P
i
B(t) of voting for the two options, which are the direct
determinants of the group’s resulting decision accuracy. We
simulate learning dynamics for a wide range of group sizes N and
across all combinations of cue reliabilities rL and rH in order to
assess how collective learning functions under different conditions.
(e) Model extensions
In the model framework presented (figure 2), we have
deliberately made biologically realistic but relatively simple
assumptions. However our model is robust to deviations from these
assumptions. For example, as we show in supplemental text S3 and
figure S4, the general conclusions we arrive at do not depend on the
exact choice of the collective decision rule by which consensus
decision-making is achieved, nor on the specific individual voting
rule (linear or nonlinear) (supplemental text S2 and figure S3). In
addition, though not addressed here, the model framework can
readily be tailored to generate predictions about specific behavioral
contexts or animal species, including species in which consensus is
not strongly enforced, or in which individuals have varying degrees
of influence in the group decision, due to behavioral syndromes,
differing physiological needs, or dominance hierarchies. Alternate
learning rules may also be studied. The core ingredients are merely
that (1) individual experiences are influenced by other group
members and (2) learning occurs with regard to the experienced
outcome, not the individually preferred one.
Results
(a) Collective learning across environments
In the case of non-social animals, or those in isolation (N~1), if
both cues indicate that the same option is superior, maximizing
reward rate requires an individual to choose that option. However,
if the two cues indicate that different options are superior, then the
individual should choose the option indicated by the more reliable
cue: p ~0 if rLvrH and p ~1 if rLwrH (where asterisks denote
the optimal behavior). If we simulate such a case, we find that
isolated individuals do learn to give greater weight to the option
indicated by the more reliable cue, such that pv0:5 when rLvrH
and pw0:5 when rLwrH (figure 3a). This result is compatible with
previous experiments on isolated animals [70–71].
If the collective learning process is unaffected by the observa-
tional correlation of cues or group size, we might expect the
learned voting behavior of individuals in groups (Nw1) to be
Figure 3. The learned and optimal behavioral strategies of individuals in a social context, across environmental conditions and group
sizes. (a–d) The mean learned voting behavior p (the probability that individuals use the low correlation cue), for all combinations of reliabilities of the
low correlation cue (rL) and high correlation cue (rH ) for (a) group sizeN~1 (isolated case), (b) N~5, (c)N~10, and (d)N~50. For each environment
and group size combination, 500 simulations of 1000 training trials were performed, using a learning rate of a~0:1, and the mean behavior of the last
100 trials across the simulations is reported. (e–h) The optimal voting behavior for the environments and group sizes shown in (a–d).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003762.g003
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identical to that of isolated individuals. This is not what we
observe. As group size increases, the learned voting behavior
changes, such that individuals rely more heavily on the low
correlation cue for a given environment (figure 3b–d), indicative of
effective collective learning. For relatively large groups (N§10),
individuals rely primarily on the high correlation cue only when
that cue is extremely reliable (figure 3c–d).
Consensus decision-making therefore results in learned individ-
ual voting behavior that is markedly different from that exhibited
by isolated individuals under identical environmental conditions.
We find that the coupling between the learning of group members
allows individuals to incorporate observational correlations,
reliabilities, and group size into their valuation (associative
strength) of the cues in a way that allows them to make
substantially more accurate consensus decisions.
(b) The optimality of collectively learned behavior
The above results demonstrate that grouping individuals exhibit
learned voting behavior that depends not only on cue reliability,
but also on the observational correlation of environmental cues, as
well as group size (without requiring them to be able to estimate
any of these explicitly). However, it is not clear, given the
environmental conditions, how close the resulting performance is
to that which is optimal. To investigate this, we derived the
optimal individual voting behavior that maximizes collective
accuracy, for any environmental condition (rL and rH ) and group
size N. In the case where both cues indicate that the same option is
superior, an individual should vote for the indicated option.
However, when the two cues indicate that different options are
superior, the optimal behavior is to vote for the option indicated
by the low correlation cue with probability p~1 when its
reliability is greater than that of the high correlation cue (rLwrH ),
p~0 when the high correlation cue is very reliable
(rHw
1
1zb(Nz1)=2
), and otherwise p~ (b
1zc{ac)(1zb)
b2zc{ac
, where
a~
1{rH
rH
, b~
1{rL
rL
, and c~
2
N{1
(see supplemental text S4 for
the complete proof). In short, when the two cues indicate different
options are superior, the optimal voting behavior is to choose
exclusively the option indicated by the high or low correlation cue
if its reliability is sufficiently high, and otherwise to exhibit a mixed
strategy in which individuals probabilistically choose either option
(figure 3e–h).
We illustrate how the collective accuracy varies with the
individual voting behavior for a range of environmental conditions
and group sizes, and we show the optimal voting behavior (yellow
triangles) and the learned voting behavior (black stars) on this
landscape (figure 4). When rLwrH (black lines), it is always
optimal to choose exclusively the option indicated by the low
correlation cue regardless of group size. When rL~rH (red lines),
individuals in isolation (N~1) should value the two cues equally
but, in groups, should rely exclusively on the low correlation cue.
When rLvrH (blue lines), individuals in isolation (N~1) should
choose exclusively the option indicated by the high correlation
cue. However, as group size increases, the optimal behavior
gradually shifts towards greater reliance on the low correlation
cue. In all cases, we observe that the learned behavior closely
tracks the optimal behavior (figure 4).
We generalize this result by showing the collective accuracy as a
result of the collectively learned voting behavior for all environ-
ments and a wide range of group sizes (supplemental figure S5).
We further show this accuracy as a fraction of the maximum
possible accuracy, achieved by the optimal voting behavior
(figure 5a–d) and find that across all conditions, the achieved
accuracy is extremely close to the maximum possible.
An implicit assumption in studies of collective intelligence is that
the ‘wisdom of crowds’ accrues due to individuals pooling
knowledge that was learned independently. If true, then one
would expect individuals that exhibit a voting behavior learned in
isolation, and whose opinions are subsequently pooled into a
group decision, to also exhibit a high degree of collective
intelligence. In fact, we find that such groups perform relatively
poorly (figure 5e–h), and do so increasingly for larger group size.
Therefore, we find that it is not sufficient for individuals to learn in
isolation and to subsequently pool their knowledge. Instead, it is
important for individuals to incorporate observational correlation
and group size into their valuation of a cue, for which collective
learning is critical.
In this model, and based on theoretical and empirical evidence
[17–18,28,34], we assumed that animal groups make decisions
through simple majority rule. However, this is only one particular
Figure 4. The accuracy landscape of collective decisions. Lines denote the collective accuracy as a function of voting behavior p for three
representative environments and for group size (a) N~1, (b) N~5, and (c) N~10; yellow triangles denote the optimal voting behavior that results in
the maximum collective accuracy; black stars represent the voting behavior learned by our model for that group size and environment. As group size
increases, it is optimal to rely increasingly on the low correlation cue, regardless of the environmental contingencies. The learned behavior is able to
track this shift in the optimal behavior, resulting in near-optimal accuracies for any group size and environment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003762.g004
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method of aggregating opinions. For example, an alternative
consensus decision rule is to decide on an option only if a
minimum proportion of the group votes for that option (,50% or
.50%, representing submajority and supermajority thresholds,
respectively). This may occur in the context of predator detection
where, because of asymmetric costs, the reaction of a small
proportion of the group may cause the entire group to flee [30,72].
Limiting a group to simple majority rule, rather than the more
general sub- and supermajority thresholds, could, in principle,
constrain the accuracy that a group may attain. The provably
optimal voting rule for groups in which members indicate their
vote, explicitly count votes, and can adopt any type of vote
aggregation rule (capabilities unlikely to be available to most
animal groups) was found by Nitzan and Paroush [62], in the
context of human organizations such as juries, governing bodies,
and medical panels. They found that the optimal strategy is to
adjust the majority threshold according to the cue reliabilities and
group size.
We compared the efficacy of this ‘globally optimal’ group
consensus decision rule to the optimal individual voting behavior
with the constraint of simple majority rule that we identified and
found that the two rules result in nearly identical collective
accuracies (supplemental text S5 and figure S6). Therefore, the
decentralized rule that many animals follow, in which a
probabilistic individual behavior is employed instead of a global
supermajority rule, poses very little restriction on the collective
accuracy that can be achieved by groups.
(c) Collective learning in dynamic environments
That the collectively learned individual voting behavior
substantially outperforms the behavior learned in isolation and
subsequently expressed in a group context suggests that collective
learning may play an important role in group-living. However,
many animals exist in ‘fission-fusion’ populations in which groups
readily merge and split over a period of weeks [73], days [74] or
even minutes [75–81]. Thus individuals may not repeatedly learn
about their environment with the same group members or in the
same group size. Furthermore, natural environments are dynamic,
and cues can change in their reliability in predicting the location of
food or predators (for example, food availability may be seasonal).
In order for individuals to make accurate decisions in this setting,
collective learning must be robust to the splitting and merging of
groups, and to changes in cue reliability.
We first suppose that individuals employ the optimal individual
voting behavior for their environment and group size and consider
abrupt changes in group size and environmental conditions. The
resulting accuracy experienced in the new environment is
compared to the accuracy that would result from using the
appropriate optimal voting behavior for the new environment.
Across changes in group size (supplemental figure S7a–c) and
environmental conditions (supplemental figure S8a–c), we find
that subsequent to most changes in group size and environmental
conditions, the collective accuracy remains close to optimal, even
when learning has not occurred in the new context. This is
because it is optimal to rely on the low correlation cue for most
environments and group sizes (figure 3e–h), so that changes within
that regime do not result in substantial decreases in accuracy. We
find that individuals are far from optimal only when there are large
changes in group size (particularly when many small groups are
combined into a very large group, or vice-versa) or when the
reliability of environmental cues changes drastically.
We selected several particularly challenging environmental
transitions and subjected our collective learning model to these
conditions. Individuals across all contexts are able to adaptively
adjust their voting behavior subsequent to a change in group size
or environment and reach an accuracy that is close to the
maximum possible for the new context (supplemental figure S7d–f,
Figure 5. Comparing the accuracy of collectively and individually learned behavior to the accuracy of the optimal behavior. (a–d)
The collective accuracy resulting from the collectively learned behavior as a fraction of the maximum possible for that environment and group size,
for all combinations of reliabilities of the two cues, for group size (a) N~1, (b) N~5, (c) N~10, and (d) N~50. For each environment and group size
combination, 500 simulations of 1000 training trials were performed, using a learning rate of a~0:1, and the mean behavior of the last 100 trials
across the simulations is reported. (e–h) The collective accuracy resulting from the behavior learned in isolation as a fraction of the maximum possible
for that environment and group size.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003762.g005
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S8d–f). Learning in one environment does not preclude learning in
a new environment, nor does the collective context impede
adapting to changing environments. Thus, fission-fusion dynamics
do not necessarily limit the ability of animals to locate the effective
voting behavior across a wide range of group sizes.
Discussion
To date, studies of associative learning have largely been
informed by experiments on individuals in isolation. Under such
circumstances, there is direct feedback between preference and
experience that often allows individuals to accurately learn the
value of cues in the environment. However, many organisms
spend at least part of their lives in groups and in order to maintain
the benefits of group living, often must make consensus decisions.
Coming to a consensus decouples the direct relationship between
individual preferences and the outcomes of decisions, and it is not
clear how animals could learn an accurate valuation of environ-
mental cues.
Here we demonstrate that embedding simple associative
learning in a social context fundamentally alters what individuals
learn about their environment and spontaneously allows organ-
isms to achieve close to provably optimal collective decision-
making, regardless of environmental conditions. This is in contrast
to individuals who learn in isolation and subsequently pool
information as a group, which can result in relatively poor
collective decision-making when cues have varying degrees of
observational correlation.
We show that the individual behavior that maximizes collective
decision accuracy is a function of both group size and the
properties of environmental cues (notably their reliability and the
observational correlation between individuals). However, when
learning collectively, individuals are able to accurately value
environmental cues without explicitly estimating any of these
parameters. Thus, sophisticated cognitive processes are not
necessary for highly effective decision-making in a wide range of
environments.
While our results are robust to relaxing several of the model
assumptions (see supplemental text S2,S3 and figures
S3,S4,S7,S8), our model framework can also be applied to other
classes of collective decision-making mechanisms [82–90]. For
example, it is plausible that learned knowledge of the environment
(encoded by the associative strengths) may translate into influence
in the group decision, whereby individuals with stronger opinions
about which option is superior may have greater influence [91–
92]. Furthermore, many groups are composed of dominance
hierarchies with a small subset of individuals controlling the group
decision [24], individuals in groups may have intrinsically different
leadership abilities due to behavioral syndromes [93], and
individuals may have different physiological needs [94]. These
may all contribute to differential influence in the group decision
and consequently alter what is learned by group members. These
modifications, which may more accurately model particular
animal species, are interesting avenues of future research given
their potential effect on collective learning in animal groups.
In our model we assumed that an individual’s learning rule is
similar to that found in animals learning in isolation. This
assumption precluded an individual from directly detecting the
observation correlation of cues or the size of the group, parameters
that we showed to be important in the determination of the
optimal behavior. Nonetheless, even if individuals were not
afforded additional cognitive or communication abilities, they
were able to learn near optimal behavior. However, it is possible
that the learning rule is indeed different for animals in a collective
context. Our work suggests the need for empirical work that
studies how associative learning functions within animal groups.
We have considered a simple, and potentially ubiquitous, form
of collective learning, in which individuals’ experiences of the
environment is biased by the experiences of others. The same
learning rules that are known to lead to effective decision-making
in single individuals are shown to be equally effective in groups of
any size. This affords social organisms a robust and simple
mechanism for learning behaviors that lead to accurate decisions
in relatively complex environments containing multiple cues that
vary in reliability and observational correlation, and which may
fluctuate in time. Therefore, collective learning may allow even
simple group-living organisms to reliably achieve collective
wisdom across diverse environmental and social contexts.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Illustration of the zones of interaction in the
spatial model. Individuals are repelled by any neighbors found
in the inner zone (with radius ) and this repulsion force takes
precedence over any other social forces or innate preferences.
Individuals are attracted to, and align with, neighbors within the
outer zone (with radius q). Individuals cannot detect others outside
of this outer zone.
(TIFF)
Figure S2 Comparing the behavior of the spatial
schooling model to the assumptions of simple majority
rule. (a–c) The proportion of trials in which a given fraction of
the group reached target A, when half of the group prefers target
A and the other half prefers target B. In simulated groups, either
none or all of the individuals reach target A, demonstrating a high
degree of group cohesion. Shown is the result of 10000 simulated
decision-making bouts for each group size. (d–f) The proportion of
trials that the group arrives at target A when a given fraction of the
group prefers target A. The group tends to arrive at target A only
when more than half of the group prefers target A, which agrees
with simple majority rule. Shown is the result of 1000 simulated
decision-making bouts for each fraction of the group and group
size.
(TIFF)
Figure S3 Collective learning for a range of logistic voting
behavioral rules. Top row illustrates different steepnesses of the
logistic function used for the voting behavior, from very shallow (left) to
very steep (right). Bottom row shows the resulting collective accuracy
(as a fraction of the maximum possible accuracy for that environmental
condition and group size) as a function of the steepness of the voting
rule. All possible combinations of group sizes N~ 1,5,10,100f g,
rL~ 0:5,0:6,0:7,0:8,0:9,1:0f g, and rH~ 0:5,0:6,0:7,0:8,0:9,1:0f g
were tested. For each combination, 1000 simulations were performed
for 1000 training trials using a learning rate of a~0:1, and the mean
collective accuracy of the last 100 trials across all simulations was
calculated. Collective learning suffers at very shallow logistic functions
for the number of trials but performs equivalently well at sufficiently
steep functions.
(TIFF)
Figure S4 The learned and optimal voting behavior of
individuals in a collective context, across environmental
conditions and group sizes, for groups employing a
logistic consensus decision rule. (a–d) The mean learned
voting behavior, or probability p that individuals vote for the
option indicated by the low correlation cue, for all combinations of
reliabilities of the low correlation cue (rL) and high correlation cue
(rH ) for (a) group size N~1 (isolated individuals), (b) N~5, (c)
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N~10, and (d) N~50. For each environment and group size
combination, 500 simulations of 1000 training trials were
performed, using a learning rate of a~0:1, and the mean
behavior of the last 100 trials across the simulations was plotted.
(e–h) The optimal voting behavior for the environments and
group sizes shown in (a–d).
(TIFF)
Figure S5 The collective accuracy resulting from the
collectively learned behavior. (a–d) The mean collective
accuracy for all combinations of reliabilities of the two cues, for (a)
group size N~1, (b) N~5, (c) N~10, and (d) N~50. For each
environment and group size combination, 500 simulations of 1000
training trials were performed, using a learning rate of a~0:1, and
the mean behavior of the last 100 trials across the simulations was
used.
(TIFF)
Figure S6 Comparison of collective accuracy resulting
from the optimal voting rule with the constraint of
simple majority rule to the accuracy attained when any
group decision rule can be employed (the ‘global’
optimal rule). For each group size, we tested all combinations
of cue reliabilities rL and rH and calculated the fraction of the
accuracy of the globally optimal rule that the simple majority
optimal rule achieves. Across all group sizes and environments, the
simple majority optimal rule nearly always achieves greater than
99% of the accuracy of the globally optimal rule.
(TIFF)
Figure S7 Collective learning subsequent to abrupt
changes in group size for three representative environ-
ments. (a–c) We assume that individuals use the voting behavior
that is optimal for the environment and starting group size (y-axis)
and calculate the difference in collective accuracy that results from
using that behavior in a range of new group sizes (x-axis) relative to
the optimal behavior for the new group size. (d–f) We select four
of the most challenging conditions in each environment (colored
dots in a–c) and simulate collective learning in those contexts.
Colors of lines match the dots in (a–c). Following the change in
group size (which occurs after 500 trials), individuals in all
conditions asymptote at close to the maximum possible for the new
context.
(TIFF)
Figure S8 Collective learning subsequent to abrupt
changes in the reliability of environmental cues for
three representative group sizes. (a–c) For simplicity, we fix
the reliability of the high correlation cue at rH~0:75 and consider
all combinations of changes in the reliability of the low correlation
cue. We assume that individuals use the voting behavior that is
optimal for the starting environment and group size (y-axis) and
calculate the difference in collective accuracy that results from
using that behavior in a range of ending reliabilities of the low
correlation cue (x-axis) compared to the optimal behavior for that
environment. (d–f) We select four of the most challenging
conditions in each group size (dots in a–c) and simulate collective
learning in those contexts. Colors of lines match the dots in (a–c).
Following the change in cue reliability (which occurs after 500
trials), individuals in all conditions asymptote to close to the
maximum possible for the new context.
(TIFF)
Text S1 Comparing simple majority rule to a full
spatial model of collective decision-making. Description
of the spatial schooling model and comparison of its behavior to
our assumptions of consensus and simple majority rule.
(PDF)
Text S2 Relaxing the assumption of linear voting
behavior. Comparison of the collective accuracy resulting from
a family of logistic (non-linear) voting behavior rules.
(PDF)
Text S3 Relaxing the assumption of simple majority
rule. Comparison of the learned behavior resulting from a family
of logistic (non-linear) collective decision rules.
(PDF)
Text S4 Proof of the optimal voting behavior for animal
groups. Detailed derivation of the optimal voting behavior.
(PDF)
Text S5 Comparing the optimal restricted voting rule to
the globally optimal voting rule. Comparison of the
individual-level optimal voting rule to the globally optimal voting
rule reveals little loss of collective accuracy.
(PDF)
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